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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-6111

1 9 JUN 1986

AT-TSC-86-004A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT:

Overseas Reductions (U)

Reference: Your letter ER TS 0144/1 86, 9 June 1986, same subject.

- 1. (TS) In response to reference, I asked my HUMINT Collection Operations Manager to review our capability to absorb the proposed levels of cuts that Secretary Shultz requested in his letter to you of 5 June. I'm sure you fully appreciate that after nearly 6 years of constructive and much-needed rebuilding of our overseas HUMINT collection capability, bolstered as it has been during the last 3 years by the centralizing of DOD HUMINT management and the issuance of the DOD HUMINT Plan, this is not something we in DIA approach with enthusiasm. The growing terrorism threat to overseas based Americans, linked with the potential of funding austerity, presents an obvious need for reductions. Reducing our intelligence collection and processing capability overseas—particularly in the critical Third World—seems to be less than prudent. It is in response to a growing terrorism that we most need a properly manned, focused intelligence presence in position, and I am fundamentally not prepared to take the position that the DOD HUMINT collection capability overseas is of sufficient size that we can now begin to cut it back.
- 2. (TS) We have recently done a very specific examination of our worldwide Defense Attache System billets with a view to identifying 17 positions which could be withdrawn in order to provide the manpower spaces in CONUS to build a portion of a more effective, more dynamic, and centrally responsive DOD clandestine capability. We believe that tradeoff is a balanced equation, as well as a worthwhile investment in a critical requirement. The specific positions we have identified are at enclosure 1. Any reduction in addition to those 17 spaces done as an excursion to provide a national drawdown eats directly into our collection capability and works to dismantle a deployed system of inestimable value. The 17 spaces which we have identified from within

but we have thoroughly evaluated that lost collection against the potential of an improved and properly manned clandestine system. To identify additional cuts up to the 8 percent limit you seek (a loss of 71 spaces overall) would not, in my judgment, be prudent at this time. This is not to say it is impossible, but until we can meet as you

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suggest, and specifically define what the Intelligence Community is prepared to support in this effort, DIA is not prepared to present a list of spaces additional to the 17 discussed above.

3. (U) I look forward to meeting with you to discuss the Intelligence Community position in this matter.

l Enclosure
Position Cuts (U)

LEONARD H. PERROOTS Lieutenant General, USAF Director

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